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Implications on American Cold War Nuclear Policy
and Opinion
Claire Dawkins, State University of New York at New Paltz
Conference Paper (Undergraduate)
Abstract
On November 10th, 1983 the TV movie, The Day After aired in the living
rooms of homes across America. This dramatic portrayal of a nuclear attack
on the citizens of Kansas and Missouri, scared Americans watching. Depicting
the desolate landscape of a post-nuclear-attack world, paired with the feeling
of inevitability of nuclear destruction, the American people began to change
their feelings about nuclear weapons. But why does this movie matter? And
how can we trace any meaningful influence this movie had on American
Culture and understanding of nuclear war? This paper intends to expose the
ways The Day After changed American society from the average American, to
the Reagan administration making important policy decisions.
This movie did three things, first it increased nuclear awareness in America’s
general public with an increase in letter writing campaigns, voting and general
concern in foreign affairs. Next, anti-nuclear organizations were able to use
this movie as a steppingstone to increase awareness and raise money for
anti-nuclear campaigns. Finally, anxiety from the general public creeped into
the white house and we can see real-time rapid changes to public policy and
foreign relations in Reagan’s administration.
This paper exposes how forms of media and art can create real change
politically, socially and culturally. Instead of responding to change, we can
see media shaping change.
Key words: Cold War, media, political policy, The Day After
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On November 20th, 1983, the TV movie, The Day After was broadcast in
homes across America. Viewers settled into what, at first, appeared to be a
story about everyday life in Kansas and Missouri. The first half of the movie
depicts the lives of Dr. Russel Oakes and his family, Billy McCoy, an airman
stationed outside of Kansas City, and the Dahlberg family in Harrisonville
Missouri, over thirty miles away from Kansas City. The Oakes struggle with
the reality that their daughter is moving out, while the Dahlbergs prepare for
the wedding of their oldest daughter, Denise. In the background, radios and
televisions murmur about escalating political tensions and nuclear threats, but
no one pays them much mind. The characters move through their days with
mentions of Communism and international political tensions always lingering
in the background, on televisions and radios.
Suddenly, air raid sirens go off, signaling the beginning of a nuclear attack.
Across Kansas City and Lawrence, citizens scramble for shelters to escape the
fallout zone. Finally, a nuclear blast hits Kansas City. The rest of the scene is
a nuclear blast in action; citizens close to the blast zone are immediately
incinerated. Their skeletons glow as their bodies are vaporized in the nuclear
blast. A mushroom cloud appears over the horizon, Dr. Russel Oakes sees the
effects of the nuclear blast from outside the city. The last half of the movie
shows life after the nuclear blast and how radiation affects the people left.
The youngest Dahlberg, Danny goes blind after looking directly at the nuclear
blast. Denise Dahlberg, Danny, Russel Oakes and a hitchhiking college
student are all slowly killed by radiation poisoning. And the movie closes with
Professor Huxley, a supporting character, trying to contact survivors with a
radio. No one responds.
How did the American public react to this movie? To put it plainly, not well.
The image of the mushroom cloud, vaporized people, and the lasting effects
of nuclear radiation alarmed the public. While Americans were exposed to
conversations about nuclear war and conflicts with the Soviets, the
information they had was limited and often wrong. U.S. officials widely
circulated images of the Mushroom cloud hovering over Hiroshima, but they
were not transparent about the real effects of a nuclear blast and how
radiation can affect the human body in the fallout zone (Masco, 2008, p.368).
Many Americans felt betrayed and scared when they were faced with the
reality of nuclear weapons through a TV movie. Renee Blackwell, a 15-yearold student told The New York Times, ''I think I'd rather die than survive a
nuclear war...Nuclear war was always in the back of my mind, but that show
really woke me up” (Collins, 1983). Others had similar reactions. Martin
Ebert, an engineer who sold nuclear survival suits explained that after The
Day After hit screens across America, he saw a significant increase in his
sales. Before November of 1983, the majority of his sales were to
Government agencies, but for the first time a market opened up to an
average citizen (“Increased Sales,” 1983). Public outcry and preparation are
two ways the public responded to The Day After, but the effects of this movie
go further than just this.
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The Day After was a cultural phenomenon that shifted how Americans thought
about nuclear weapons, Soviet and American relations, and the Cold War.
This paper focuses on the cultural implications of this movie in Reagan’s
America. Why was The Day After so important in its moment? What made this
movie a cultural phenomenon? How did it influence how Americans thought
about nuclear weapons? This paper will argue that The Day After influenced
political action in many spheres. First, The Day After helped pro-freeze
organizations extend their messages and agendas, which rallied for total
nuclear disarmament and an extension of world peace. The Day After also
created a sense of nuclear fear in the American public not seen since the
1960s, thus politicizing Americans around nuclear weapons more than any
time before. Finally, The Day After pushed the Reagan administration to
change its nuclear stances and created change in how the world community
understood nuclear war. The Day After did not just reflect the political climate
of the 1980s, Cold War America, it drove political change and affected policy.
Three major changes came about after The Day After: the American public
became more politicized and concerned about nuclear war, pro-freeze
organizations took the opportunity to increase their campaigning and
activism, and the Reagan administration drastically changed their nuclear
policies as a direct result of the movie.
The Day After movie represented an important cultural and political event in
the 1980’s America, but it is largely absent from the scholarship on that
period. Scholars have written extensively about cultural representations of
nuclear war, but most scholars focus on the cultural climate of the 1950s, and
1960s at the height of McCarthyism and the Hollywood blacklist. In the
article, “Sheltering Time: The Containment of Everyday life in Nuclear-Shelter
Film Narratives” Andrea Vesentini explores how nuclear shelters were
depicted in movies and their meaning in a larger cultural context. Vesentini
argues that, “Films were also more effective than pamphlets in that they
provided a vision of the bomb. In order to stress the actuality of the threat,
civil defense used videos to generate terror among the population with a
spectacle of disaster” (Vesentini, 2015, p.43). Vesentini emphasizes the
weight that films carry for an audience, but she focusses on 1950s and 1960s
movies and leaves out the nuclear fear movies of the 1980s, including The
Day After. Frances Stonor Saunders has a similar issue in his book, The
Cultural Cold War: The CIA and the World of Arts and Letters. Saunders’ book
focused once again on the 1950s and 1960s, and the House Un-American
Activities committee. Saunders’ approach is to analyze how the United States
Government controlled and censored movies for their own gain. Saunders
argues that the U.S. government manipulated the film industry to warp
American’s perceptions of Communism. Saunders’ focus is the reverse of
mine. He looks at how the American government attempted to change its
citizens' political opinions, while this paper investigates how a movie changed
political opinions of Americans without any influence from the government.
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The scholarship on Cold War movies lacks a necessary investigation into the
1980s. This paper intends to fill that gap in the scholarship.
Histories of America under Reagan and general histories of 1980s political and
cultural history also leave out The Day After. In Beth A. Fischer’s article, “US
Foreign policy under Reagan and Bush”, she explains Reagan’s foreign policy
initiatives during his term. Reagan began his term throwing threats at the
Soviet Union about nuclear weapons, and then made a sudden transition in
his policies in January of 1984 (2012, p.274). Yet, like many other scholars,
she does not mention The Day After which came out only two months before
Reagan’s policy change and created mass hysteria in the American public. It
is only when The Day After is the main subject of scholarship do we see
Reagan and the movie together.
In the article, “‘Remember! It’s only a movie!’ Expectations and Receptions of
The Day After (1983)” Deron Overpeck focusses on the political influences of
the movie’s production, and the responses of the public and political
organizations. This lens is important, yet it is only found in histories of film,
almost never in political histories of the United States under Reagan. What
differentiates this paper from Overpeck’s is that first, Overpeck argues that
this movie had no meaningful change on public opinions on nuclear policy.
And second, Overpeck does not draw connections between Reagan’s change
in nuclear policy in 1984 to the film released just a few months earlier. This
paper will argue that The Day After had larger implications, focusing on
everyday Americans and political, pro-freeze organizations.
The Day After sets a precedent on how we can view the interactions between
media and history. Unlike most films which act as a reaction to a historical
moment, or change, The Day After acts as a facilitator for change. It is vital to
take this framework and begin to apply it to how we see other forms of media
possibly shaping political opinions and even government actions. We are still
living in the political and social fallout of the Cold War, so it is necessary to
first, look at how media shaped opinions and actions in the moment it was
created, but also how media continues to shape us today. Movies are no
longer only a reaction to politics and society, but they can actively shape it;
by viewing media in this way, not only can new social commentaries about
the past be made, but also about our present moment. At the bare minimum,
this paper intends to convince you of The Day After’s importance in 1980s
politics and social opinion. But in the larger scope of importance and lasting
impact, this paper is meant to also shift your opinion on the lasting impacts
media of all forms have on individual opinions and also how they cause
change on a larger scale.

Historical Context
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Nuclear weapons defined the political climate of the late 1970s and early
1980s. The American public was anxious about aggressions from the Soviet
Union. President Carter and later President Reagan only increased those
fears. Jimmy Carter’s presidency was laced with anxiety from the American
public. Carter focused on human rights appeals, pulling American forces out
of other countries and slowing the arms race. In 1979 Carter negotiated with
the Soviet Union to slow the production of nuclear weapons for both sides in
the SALT II meetings. But to the public, it appeared that the Russians were
increasing their arsenal, while the Americans were decreasing theirs (Frankel,
1992, p.96). Polls taken in 1977 and 1978 showed that for the first time since
the 1960s, a majority of American citizens were worried about Soviet power
and the threat of Communism (Njølstad, 2012, p.149). Americans were
feeling the threat of nuclear war hanging over their heads, yet it appeared
that their leader was not fighting back.
Carter’s foreign policies focused on the global south, namely Panama, and
other developing nations. This made the American public think that he was
not only failing at Soviet/U.S. relations, but also essentially ignoring it. Carter
also failed in the eyes of the American people over the Iran Hostage crisis. On
November 4th, 1979, revolutionaries took over Iran and the Shah fled,
allowing a new government to take his place. Americans working in
government offices in Iran were taken hostage. Months passed and Carter
continued to fail to negotiate with the Iranians, leaving the Americans there
for 444 days. As an insult to Carter, the hostages were not released until he
left office (Frankel, 1992, p.27). President Carter’s foreign policy failures
created a move towards conservative, pro-American thought in the American
public. These sentiments assisted President Reagan’s election in 1980.
In the 1980s, Americans were nervous. Ronald Reagan, who had just entered
office, promised to crack down on Communism. After Jimmy’s Carter’s relaxed
policies on Communism, many Americans were nervous about Soviet and
American relations. Reagan promised to be tough on Communism. In 1981,
Reagan vowed: “[The West] will dismiss [Communism] as some bizarre
chapter in human history whose last pages are even now being written”
(Fischer, 2012, pp.269-270). This quote, like many others, was a direct threat
to the Soviet Union, and Communism at large. In 1981, Reagan was just
beginning his presidency, and his stance on Communism needed to be firm
for the American public to support him. Reagan was not afraid to express his
opinions of the Soviet Union to the American public and the world at large.
Yet on the other side of the spectrum, Americans were becoming increasingly
worried once again about the reality of a nuclear war.
Reagan moved quickly to arm America and to let the American public know he
was doing so. In a total reversal of Carter’s SALT II policies, Reagan rapidly
increased American nuclear warheads and America expanded the military. The
years 1981 to 1985 saw the largest increase of peacetime military funding in
America to date (Fischer, 2012, p.270). In March 1982, Reagan announced
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his plans for the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), which promised to protect
Americans from Soviet ballistic missiles. This plan outlined that shields would
be erected around the coasts of major cities. Many Americans became
concerned about the cost of this project, while world leaders became nervous
for their own safety. European countries worried that they would now become
the main target of Soviet attacks (Hilstrom, 2006, p. 402).
While Reagan built up America’s nuclear arsenal and boosted the military, he
publicly shamed the Soviets for their weapons. In Spring of 1982 he
announced START, the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks. These talks were
meant to equalize the number of nuclear warheads in each country. Yet the
guidelines of this agreement required that the Soviets would destroy more
than half of their arsenal, while American continued to build theirs up. To no
one’s surprise, the Soviets did not agree to this. Tensions grew. In November
of 1981, Reagan proposed the zero option treaty which once again favored
the US. It called for the removal of all intermediate-range nuclear weapons
from Europe, but at this time the Soviets were the only ones with weapons in
Europe (Fischer, 1997, p. 484). Once again, the Soviets refused. Beth A.
Fischer, a historian of Cold War America, explains, “Washington made little
effort to address Soviet concerns or to offer proposals that Moscow could find
remotely acceptable. This strongly suggested that the Reagan administration
was not genuinely interested in arms control.” (1997, p.485). Americans were
getting the idea that Reagan was not looking to negotiate. He was just
looking for weapons and defense.
America went from a liberal, relaxed leader who supported nuclear
disarmament, to an aggressive conservative leader who was focused on
building up nuclear arsenals more than anything else. Because of Carter’s
focus on disarmament, the American public was nervous about being
unprepared and for an impending nuclear war. This anxiety is what enabled
Reagan to be elected. Reagan’s aggressive foreign policy with the Soviet
Union, paired with his pro-nuclear agenda, made Americans feel a new,
different kind of fear. Instead of fearing that they would be unprepared, the
American public was now worried about egging on a nuclear war which would
send the global community into ruins. While many Americans felt that Carter
was not tough enough on Communism, when Reagan came into office, his
policies scared Americans in a new way. The shift in nuclear fears in the early
1980s begins with Reagan and his aggressive rhetoric and plans.

The Day After
While military tensions are rising in the US, writer Edward Hume, director
Nicholas Meyes and producers, Robert Papazian and Stephanie Austin began
to develop The Day After. In the beginning stages of the movie’s production
the United States Department of Defense offered the filmmakers money for
production, on the grounds that the script would blame the Soviet Union for
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the war. The team denied the funding (Overpeck, 2012, p. 272). At first the
team advertised The Day After as an a-political movie, harboring no
favoritism or agenda. Deron Overpeck explains how an a-political framework
for the movie began to break down: “[Hume] relied exclusively on pro-freeze
or disarmament texts, or sources that emphasized the horrendous destruction
that would ensue after a nuclear exchange” (Overpeck, 2012, p.273). Hume
was directly referencing pro-freeze documents when he was writing the
movie, all of his inspiration came from the framework of pro-freeze
organizations. From the beginning of the project, Meyer and Hume were
infusing this movie with political motives and bias, as it is almost impossible
to tell the story of a nuclear attack without politics. As The Day After was
gaining media attention and the public began to talk about this TV event,
nuclear freeze organizations were given early access to the movie and ample
advertisement slots (Overpeck, 2012, p.279). This angered conservatives who
supported America’s arsenal of nuclear weapons, because despite claiming to
be a-political, The Day After team was demonstrating the exact opposite.
Finally, just a few weeks before the movie was released, the film makers
came forward and announced that the movie had a pro-freeze leaning, and
now citizens just had to wait for the movie in order to make up their own
minds.

The Days Before
The opening scene of The Day After reads: “We are grateful to the people of
Lawrence, Kansas for their participation and help in the making of this film”
(Meyer, 1983). The Day After filmed on location, using the local residents as
extras. Lawrence Kansas, and Kansas City, Missouri seemed like odd places to
base a nuclear attack movie, but that was exactly what the filmmaker
wanted. The central characters are everyday Midwesterners. Dr. Oakes is a
dedicated doctor, with a loving relationship with his wife and daughter, the
Dahlbergs are a farming family, and Billy McCoy is a dedicated airman
working for the military, stationed just outside of Kansas City. These
characters were specific representations of “everyday Americans.” These
people do not live in a big city or work prestigious jobs, but they are as
susceptible to nuclear attack as anyone in the country. The idea that any
American could be hit by a nuclear attack was ingrained into the minds of the
audience from the moment they tuned into the film. Thirty minutes into the
movie, Dr. Oakes and a coworker discuss the reports, “There are even people
leaving Kansas City because of the missile field. Now I ask you, where does
one go from Kansas City? Yukon? Tahiti? We are not talking about Hiroshima
anymore…” (Meyer, 1983, 32:17-32:35). Characters are discussing that there
is nowhere to go. The movie implies that if places like Kansas City were in
fear of being bombed, no place in America was safe.
The Cold War serves as a vague backdrop to the daily lives of the characters.
In the first half of the movie, characters hear TV and radio reports of Soviet
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aggression in Europe, as tensions rise in East and West Germany. East
Germany invades West Germany and drops bombs on their hospitals, schools
and government facilities. Things start heating up when Steven Klein hears
that Soviets have invaded West Berlin. This scene is a commentary on Cold
War politics. No matter how antinuclear this movie may be, the filmmakers
still made Communists the aggressors. One girl in the crowd says “Fantasy
Land” in response to the news broadcaster speculating about nuclear
weapons. She offers a politically driven critique of American military policy:
“Look, did we help the Czechs, the Hungarians, the Afghans or the Poles?
Well, we're not going to nuke the Russians to save the Germans. I mean if
you were talking oil in Saudi Arabia, I’d be real worried.” (Meyer, 1983,
36:29-36:45). For a movie that originally claimed the be anti-political, a
strong commentary on American foreign policy and its violent links to the oil
industry are seen here. Steven Klein decides to hitchhike home, Dr. Oakes
leaves work to be with his family, and the Dahlbergs leave church to prepare
their basement as a shelter. The next scene is in a supermarket where
residents of Kansas City are pushing one another and running for the
registers. While on line, Denise Dahlberg’s fiancé, Bruce Gallatin, overhears a
news report that the Russians hit an American ship in the Persian Gulf. Once
again, Communists are the aggressors, leaving the American government in a
positive light, for now.
Moving to the Dahlberg’s home, the viewer gets a quick glimpse into their
lives. Mr. Dahlberg anxiously prepares the basement, and his wife refuses to
acknowledge the problem and continues to prepare for the wedding. Mr.
Dahlberg, along with many other characters prepare for the bomb, yet none
of them seem to be adequately equipped to prepare their homes and stock
supplies. The scenes of family life are cut between images of military
preparation as soldiers run frantically to prepare and await orders from the
government. Finally, in the distance, missiles launch and the realities of
nuclear attack begin to set in. The airmen stationed at the Whiteman Airforce
panic and run into an underground shelter. Billy McCoy leaves, against orders,
to be with his family. Themes of family and companionship are strong
throughout the movie, seen in the relationships and decisions each character
makes.
The sirens sound, and families rush into city hall to a nuclear shelter. An
aerial shot of main street shows citizens like ants running frantically. Then the
bomb hits. First all the electric power goes out, all cars and trucks stop
working, and then the flash. From Dr. Oakes’ view from his car on the
highway, we see the full mushroom cloud. People scream as they are engulfed
in the blast and their skeletons glow as they are vaporized. Many of the
images of vaporized people are scenes with children and families, one is even
of a wedding. Kansas City is destroyed. We see houses and businesses
engulfed in flames, blown over from the blast and buried under rubble. The
only survivors are those in the fallout zone, who only see the massive
explosion, but do not immediately feel the effects.
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After the Bomb
There is chaos in the homes and buildings of the survivors. In the hospital,
patients resort to violence, and Dr Oakes needs to calm down a crowd. He
asks them to help the most injured and sick. The Dahlbergs have a visitor in
the upstairs of their house, and Steven comes down to stay with them after
being threatened by Mr. Dahlberg. Next, we see Billy McCoy wandering the
destroyed town around him. He passes a memorial that says, “In Memory of
our World War Veterans” and in front of it a father and young son lay dead
(Meyer, 1983, 1:15:20-1:15:33). This acts as a commentary on the victims of
the nuclear attack as victims of a world war, fighting in a war they cannot
win. Joe Huxely, a university professor, contacts Dr. Oakes over the radio and
notes the high levels of nuclear radiation in the air. More nuclear radiation is
moving in by wind from more nuclear silos out west. We are reminded of the
good, pious Christian citizens of middle America when the Dahlberg’s attend
church despite the effects of radiation still present in the air. Denise is
beginning to feel the effects of the radiation poisoning and her groin begins to
bleed, and she passes out during the sermon. As Stephen brings Denise and
Danny to the university hospital on a horse-drawn carriage, they pass men
who are hauling dead bodies on the flatbed of a truck. Danny asks Stephen
what he sees, he lies and says cows and telephone poles, things that remind
Danny of life before the blast.
In an act of satire, the President is broadcasted over the radio and tells an
uplifting message that the U.S. has not backed down from conflict, "There is
at the present time, a ceasefire with the Soviet Union which has sustained
damage equally catastrophic... we are counting on you, on your strength,
your patience, your will and your courage to help rebuild this great nation of
ours. God Bless us all" (1:39:55-1:42:05). This voice over is cut with scenes
of the suffering people, it shows the dead and dying, families hiding under
rubble and the destroyed state of life and routine. There is a strong antigovernment sentiment throughout the remainder of the movie. After this
catastrophe, the citizens are no longer willing to listen to the government’s
advice and action. Farmers including Mr. Dahlberg are told they must get rid
of their remaining topsoil, but they have no solutions to purify the soil after
that (1:48:07- 1:49:56). The remaining American government is asking its
citizens to think of the needs of the larger United States, yet individuals can
hardly keep their families alive.
In the action packed last fifteen minutes of the movie, Mr. Dahlberg is shot by
a roaming group which squatted on his property, and Dr. Oakes is quickly
succumbing to the effects of radiation. As Dr. Oakes leaves the hospital and
makes his way towards Kansas City a firing squad executes two men on the
side of the road. The United States government no longer has power over its
citizens, they are taking on responsibility for themselves. As the radiation
poisoning overcomes each character their skin turns pale and their hair falls
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out in thick chunks. When Dr. Oakes arrives at Kansas City everything is
destroyed, all that is left is the ghosts of buildings. There are scavengers
stealing wedding rings and other valuable items off of corpses. In the final
scene Dr. Oakes comes across his old house, now nothing more than a pile of
rubble. As Dr. Oakes collapses on the ground in distress a stranger embraces
him, and the camera fades out. The movie closes with these lines passing
over the screen:
“The Catastrophic events you have just witnessed are, in all likelihood,
less severe than the destruction that would actually occur in the event
of a full nuclear strike against the United States. It is hoped that the
images of this film will inspire the nations of this earth, their peoples
and leaders, to find the means to avert the fateful day” (2:04:57 2:05:13).
The movie is over and the audience is left with the lasting images of war and
destruction.

Reactions
The Public
Faced with the dramatic images of explosions and nuclear war, Americans
were terrified. In the weeks leading up the showing of The Day After news
outlets talked incessantly about the premiere of the movie. People prepared in
a variety of different ways. Young children were not advised to watch the
movie at all, while children ages twelve to fifteen could watch but they would
be closely monitored for signs of distress or anxiety afterwards (Overpeck,
2012, p.280). On the ground in schools and homes, parents and educators
were seriously worried about the lasting effects these horror filled images
could have on children. Dr. Howard H. Hiatt, the head of Harvard’s Graduate
School of Public Health warned a group of advanced high school students: “be
prepared for a dreadful experience… But see it” (Kraft, 1983, p.2). As
conversations continued in schools, excitement increased for the movie, and it
became a topic in the media, in the classroom, and in schools. Across
America, teachers were encouraged to lead discussions about the movie,
before and after it aired. Students had a variety of opinions and emotions
after seeing the movie, Nora Maccoby, a 16-year-old high school student
explained, “I expect to see [nuclear war]. I expect it in my lifetime” (“Viewers
Shocked”, 1983). Maccoby was not alone, many American citizens believed
that nuclear war was destined to happen. The threat of a nuclear strike
constantly hung over the head of American citizens, and the images of
suffering and destruction in The Day After did nothing more than heighten
these fears.
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Just like Maccoby, many people dramatically reacted to the film. In order to
begin to understand public response, we should look at how The Day After
was discussed in newspapers and between American citizens. In a New York
Times article just three days after the movie explains, “On the day after ‘The
Day After,’ the ‘experts’ gave us little reason for celebrating this year’s
Thanksgiving Day. It was just a ‘movie,’ some of them said, but they didn’t
say it in Hiroshima or Nagasaki” (Reston, 1983, p.A23). Here, the journalist,
James Reston, is explaining the overwhelming feeling of dread and fear felt
across the nation. Some people had more compassionate responses. Instead
of looking towards a desolate future, or vilifying the Soviet Union, a mother
said after the film that, “I think it’s very important for us to be nurturing
compassion in our hearts,” said Ruth Stewart. “When I think of our mothers, I
think of mothers in Russia who also don’t want their children killed”
(Linenberger,1983). Unlike many other Americans, Stewart chose to
empathize with the citizens of the Soviet Union. As we will see later on, the
safety of children is a common factor across all aspects of the nuclear
weapons debate.
The American public did not take this TV movie event lightly. Doctors began
freeing up their schedules weeks in advance to see patients who felt
traumatized by The Day After (Rothenberg, 1983). Immediately after the
movie was shown American citizens began writing to President Reagan asking
for his response. A letter written by a distraught watcher says: “‘Dear
President Reagan: Our country must not wait until the day after a nuclear
war. We must negotiate an end to the extreme danger posed by nuclear
weapons now.” The letter ends with, “‘Please Mr. President give us tomorrow’”
(Cardarella, 1983, p.1). The White House received so many calls the night of
the movie that their switchboard operators required a full day to count them
all. And ABC headquarters also reported an influx of calls, mostly in support
of the movie (Overpeck, 2012, p.280).
The Day After also popularized certain specific fears associated with nuclear
radiation and attack. In the book, Decade of Nightmares: The End of the
Sixties and the Making of Eighties America, Philip Jenkins explains the way
people thought about nuclear attack before The Day After. Jenkins explains a
common fear called the “nuclear winter theory” where a nuclear war could
damage the ecosystem and climate of the world so much that it would cause
a human extinction (222). Whether it was residual radiation directly killing
people or the destruction of the environment, a nuclear war which would
destroy any means for human survival. We can see this represented in scenes
with Mr. Dahlberg and other farmers, where they are asked to get rid of their
topsoil and prepare the ground for new planting when it is safe. But the
farmers in the film are given no clear direction on how and when they will
know their soil is safe once again. There is a direct connection between the
anxieties of people before the movie was broadcast, and the content of the
movie.
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Political Organizations
From the beginning, the political bias of The Day After had been strong. From
the first stages of writing and producing, The Day After was created with antinuclear, Pro-Freeze sentiments in mind. Because of this, pro-freeze
organizations were eager to utilize this movie to their advantage. Pro-freeze
organizations ran rallies and protests nationwide to support disarmament, “In
June 1982 over a million people attended a rally in Central Park in New York
City, calling for a freeze of nuclear weapons production” (Robert & Jones,
2016, p.442). Large protests like this placed Pro-Freeze organizations into
political conversation and importance. Deron Overpeck (1983), in his article,
“‘Remember! It’s only a Movie!’ Expectations and Receptions of the Day
After,” argues that The Day After had little impact on the public opinion of
nuclear freeze movements but it, “motivate[d] many Americans, ordinary and
otherwise, to become involved in the nuclear war debate” (p. 268). While
Overpeck’s argument leaves out the vital influence of The Day After on
political leanings, he does make strong points about political involvement.
Pro-freeze organizations capitalized on this push towards politicization by
setting up voter registration at meetings to discuss The Day After.
One pro-freeze organization called, “The 800-NUCLEAR Project” was explained
as, “an ad hoc group supported by disarmament organization and individuals
including Ralph Nader, the consumer advocate, and Hamilton Fish, publisher
of the Nation magazine” (Smith, 1983). These organizations were linked with
the peace movement and made political and social work to increase
awareness about nuclear weapons. Jack Willis, the director of the 800-Nuclear
Project explained the voter registrations, “The peace movement recognizes
that people will get depressed and feel helpless after watching the film….
That’s why we’re offering ways, such as voter registration, for people to
channel their frustrations through the political system” (Rothenberg, 1983,
p.2). These organizations saw the opportunity that The Day After presented,
and they capitalized on that hysteria.
Pro-freeze organizations such as, the 800-Nuclear Project, Nuclear Weapons
Freeze Campaign, Let Lawrence Live, the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,
The Day Before were all eager to use The Day After as a way to further their
anti-nuclear agendas. These groups showed direct support for these movies,
Randall Kehler a member of the Nuclear Weapons Freeze Campaign saw the
movie as a reality and explained, “the only sane response… is to protest the
current nuclear buildup and demand a nuclear freeze” (“Viewers Shocked,”
1983, p.3). Kehler was not alone. Many other political organizers and activists
felt that The Day After was a representation of the inevitable destruction by
nuclear weapons. Disarmament groups saw The Day After as nothing less
than a positive political move for their campaigns and agendas moving
towards nuclear peace.
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These pro-freeze organizations continued to rally behind the movie and
spread awareness for their cause. These groups also saw the movie as an
opportunity to show support and compassion to those suffering from anxiety
from watching the movie. Groups distributed, “hundreds of thousands of
viewing guides suggesting how to cope with the film: Share your feelings
before, watch in groups, and, after seeing it, ‘turn off the TV set. Stay
together… take a few minutes before people begin to speak’” (Rothenberg,
1983, p.1). These clear guidelines were meant to ease any sense of anxiety
and give people a constructive outlet on how to express their feelings about
the movie. Organizations such as the Physicians for Social Responsibility set
up hotlines for anxious watchers to call if they felt distressed. The group
explained the need for a hotline as, “given the accurate horror portrayed in
the movie, these emotions are appropriate.” (Corry, 1983). One of their
hotlines in Philadelphia received over 400 calls the night of the showing
(“Viewers shocked,” 1983, p.2).
Pro-freeze organizations were able to comfort people in need and create a
relationship where they felt supported by these organizations and, therefore,
more willing to subscribe to their mottos and agendas. This then created a
larger pro-freeze community across America. Pro-freeze organizations also
created community events in order to bring people together to watch the
movie or comment on it in some way. In Lawrence Kansas, and other towns
across America, pro-freeze organizations held candlelight vigils in response to
the movie and threats of nuclear attack (Rothenberg, 1983, p.2).
Organizations also set up letter writing campaigns in communities to urge
Reagan to change his nuclear policies. Pro-freeze organizations were creating
a direct link to communities which allowed their rhetoric and agenda to be
more readily accepted in the communities they entered. These organizations
were so successful because members were trained on how to speak to the
media. Members were each given a pamphlet which taught them how to
represent the organization in interviews (Overpeck, 2012, p.277). Pro-freeze
organizations took the opportunity which They Day After presented, and they
were able to rally support for their respective organizations and claims.
While Pro-Freeze organizations saw this movie as an opportunity to further
their own agendas, there were many conservative, pro-armament
organizations who thought differently. Pro-armament organizations and their
supporters saw this movie as a blatant hit to their ideals and to the Reagan
administration. One such organization was the Mutually Assured Destruction
Policy (MAD) which supported nuclear weapons for the protection of the U.S.
(Overpeck, 1983, 267). Reverend Jerry Falwell was upset that the movie was
popularizing disarmament in the population; he believed that it would weaken
America and leave them unprepared for a nuclear attack. Falwell wished to
boycott the companies who bought advertising time. While he later withdrew
this threat, many other people who supported nuclear arms as a necessary
part of American foreign policy saw this movie as a threat to the U.S.’ safety
(Shales, 1983). Between the pro-freeze organizations, and the conservative,
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pro-nuclear organization there was an overlap in rhetoric. Once again,
Reverend Jerry Farwell, a leader of the “Moral Majority,” a conservative
Christian group, criticized the movie for, “making a blatant political statement
in favor of disarmament. The future security of this nation and the freedom of
our children are both at stake” (Rothenberg, 1983, p.2). It is significant that
Farwell, and other supporters of nuclear weapons buildup make the argument
that in order to protect the U.S.’ children, they must have strong nuclear
weapons. Conversely, pro-freeze organizations used the same rhetoric to
support disarmament. As mentioned earlier, Reverend Bud Cooper (a
supporter of disarmament) expressed that it was necessary to disarm the
countries for the safety of the nation’s children (Cardarella, 1983). These
comparisons show two groups with ideological differences between them, yet
they were both supposedly reaching for the same goals.

Government Response
Before we begin to unravel Reagan’s involvement and reaction to The Day
After, it is important to consider how other politicians reacted to the movie.
Conservative, pro-armament politicians and politicians that supported nuclear
weapons freeze both crafted responses to The Day After, which furthered
their respective agendas. Senator Alan Cranston from California and
Representative Edward Markey from Massachusetts, both Democrats, used
The Day After to support their own policies. Cranston organized fund-raising
meetings in twenty-six states at the time of the movie’s broadcast. And
Markey organized an “awareness campaign” in 10 midwestern states, who like
Lawrence Kansas, are near nuclear missile silos (Corry, 1983). Reactions to
the movie were not limited to the general public; we can also see a number of
politicians using this movie to further their campaigns and agendas.
Since the beginning of his presidency, the Reagan administration had felt
pressure from the American people to reform their nuclear weapons policies.
In his foreign policy initiatives, Reagan was tough on communism, but his
administration left the American public generally uninformed about the reality
of nuclear radiation. Americans were shocked by the second half of The Day
After. Nuclear weapons had already been a major topic of conversation, but
the effects of long-term exposure to radiation had not been explained. The
Reagan administration originally argued a nuclear attack would be survivable,
but the movie proved that wrong (Overpeck, 2012, p.270). Now the American
public was losing trust they had in the Reagan administration. Reagan tried to
limit the damage. He said, “[The movie] didn’t say anything we didn’t know
and that is that nuclear war is horrible. And that’s why we’re doing what we’re
doing, so there won’t be one” (“Viewers Shocked,” 1983, p.2). Reagan’s
response was vague and did not clearly pinpoint a policy or strategy he
wished to pursue. In his original public responses to the movie Reagan was
careful not to allude to any plans or policy.
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Originally, on hearing the news of The Day After’s production, the White
House began a propaganda campaign right away. Originally, the White House
wanted Reagan to do a public service announcement immediately after the
end of the movie where he would, “transform the film into an argument for
his defense policies” and tell the audience, “that he was shaken by the horrors
of the film depicted but resolved never to let nuclear war happen” (Hänni,
2016, p.418). This plan would align Reagan with the American public and
comfort them, knowing the president had the same fears as them, and was
willing to do something about it. But because the Reagan administration was
nervous about being that closely associated with the movie, they pulled-out of
the deal at the last second (Hänni, 2016, p.418). Reagan was replaced by
George Shultz, who ended up making a message (Frances, 200, p.235).
These plans were not the end of Reagan’s propaganda campaign, and they
continued, for many months after the movie’s airing.
On November 4th, 1983, representatives from government agencies ranging
from the White House to FEMA met to discuss how each department should
approach the movie. Their consensus was, “Don’t fight the film, recognize the
horrors of nuclear war and take the offensive through emphasizing deterrence
and disarmament agreements” (Frances, 2000, p.235) Even before the movie
was released, the government was preparing for backlash from the American
people. The government knew that this movie would expose their policies and
the true danger of nuclear weapons, so in order to protect themselves in the
public eye, government officials all agreed not to argue with the images
presented in the film, in an attempt to maintain trust with the public. In his
personal diary, Reagan wrote about The Day After and what it meant for his
outlook on nuclear weapons:
“[The Day After] is powerfully done- all $7 mil. worth. It’s very
effective & left me greatly depressed. … Whether it will be a help to
the ‘anti nukes’ or not, I can’t say. My own reaction was one of our
having to do all we can to have a deterrent & to see there is never a
nuclear war” (Hänni, 2016, p.418).
Reagan begins this entry with his emotional reaction to the movie,
expressing that he, like many other Americans, was left distraught after the
movie. Then, he considers the impacts of this movie, and how it will affect
his foreign policy initiatives, showing that there is a direct correlation
between Reagan’s political policy and this movie. From this point forward,
Reagan and his cabinet created a plan to modify his nuclear policies in light
of the movie. Ironically, the day after The Day After, the White House held,
“Day after meetings” where members of Reagan’s cabinet discussed the
movie and planned how the government should react to it. As mentioned
earlier, the Reagan administration originally told the public that a nuclear
attack would be survivable, and the movie proved that incorrect. Instead of
arguing with the movie’s claims, the administration decided to agree with the
effects of nuclear radiation as demonstrated in the movie (Hänni, 2016, pp.
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420-421). And despite pro-armament leanings for the beginning of his
administration, Reagan and his team changed rhetoric and instead came out
in support of disarmament. Government employees were told to not
discourage anyone from seeing the movie, and they were not to dispute any
of the claims. The administration created a clear plan for each agency and
government employee to respond to the movie and this is what created
Reagan’s next policy change.
Now that the American public was more actively afraid of nuclear attack, the
U.S. government had to respond to the movie in a way which made the public
feel protected and comfortable. On January 16, 1984 Reagan gave his first
speech of the year and he made new claims on how he would treat nuclear
weapons. “With regards to nuclear weapons, the simple truth is America’s
total nuclear stockpile has declined. Today we have far fewer nuclear weapons
than we had 20 years ago” (Reagan, 1984). For the first time Reagan was not
antagonizing the Soviet Union and threatening them with attack. His dramatic
switch in rhetoric was solely to comfort the American people and make them
feel like the events of The Day After would not happen again. This approach
was once again emphasized at the end of the speech: “If the Soviet
Government wants peace, then there will be peace. Together we can
strengthen peace, reduce the level of arms” (Reagan, 1984). Reagan made a
smart political move by placing the blame of nuclear weapons and aggression
onto the Soviet Union, once again placing the U.S. in a positive light. Like the
movie depicted, Reagan is expressing that the Soviet Union are the
aggressors, and the U.S. is just defending themselves.
In his speech Reagan outlined three main plans for his future Cold War
foreign policies with the Soviet Union. First, a total nuclear disarmament,
second, to create better relationships and dialogue between Western and
Communist nations, and finally to have these nationals collaborate on regional
conflicts such as in Afghanistan (Fischer, 2012, p.273). The goals that Reagan
presented in this speech were not found anywhere else in his public
statements or policies. Because of this dramatic shift in policy only two
months after The Day After, we can conclude that due to the political impact
of this movie on the population and political groups, that Reagan felt it was
time to change his policies. The Day After scared Americans into thinking
nuclear war was around the corner, and it affirmed beliefs that it would be
impossible to recover from. Because of this intense fear Reagan had to
change his policies to ease the minds of the American public.
Reagan’s change in attitude towards the Soviet Union did not end with this
speech. After the film aired, Reagan, again wrote in his diary commenting on
his last three years in office and explained that he now understood that Soviet
leaders and citizens feared the U.S. To combat this, “I was anxious to get a
top Soviet leader in a room alone and convince him that we had no designs
on the Soviet Union and Russians had nothing to fear from us” (Fizgerald,
2000, p.238). This was a dramatic change in rhetoric for a leader who spent
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the first half of his Presidency incessantly threatening the Soviet Union.
Similarly, in the months between November 1983 and June 1984, Reagan did
his most international traveling as president. Including visiting China, the first
Communist nation he visited in his presidency. Here he signed a treaty which
increased investments and cultural exchanges between the countries. He also
visited Tokyo, where he called for the total elimination of nuclear weapons
(Fizgerald, 2000, p.235). Reagan was making clear decisions to create bonds
with Communist nations in the months after the film was aired. These
decisions were a direct result of the American public pressuring his aggressive
policies.
There are a lot of arguments within scholarship on Reagan, the end of the
cold war, and when exactly he changed his policies. Robert C. Roland and
John M. Jones in their chapter,
“Reagan’s Strategy for the Cold War and the Evil Empire Address”
argue that, …Reagan did not ‘shift towards peace’ in January 1984.
Rather, they suggest that peace and nuclear abolition had long been a
cornerstone in Reagan’s Soviet policy. Although Reagan’s tone
changed in the years that followed this address, his critique of the
Soviet system, commitment to military buildup as a means for
achieving arms reduction, and faith in the triumph of democratic
values never did (Robert & Jones, 2016, p.455). Here, the authors
argue that Reagan’s “Evil Empire” speech actually had elements of
disarmament plans. But I argue that if these claims were present, they
were overtaken by aggressive pro-American rhetoric. This rhetoric
threatened the Soviet Union so much it overshadowed any attempt for
disarmament. Many scholars argue that Reagan’s transition to
disarmament policies in late 1983 and early 1984 was just a
culmination of Reagan’s plans and ideologies all along, coming to light.
Whether or not this is true, I argue that The Day After was the final
push for Reagan to either reveal his long-standing disarmament
policies, or to change his policies only to disarmament, which he had
not considered before.”

Conclusion
The cultural and political impact of films and other popular media forms
cannot be ignored. We are accustomed to films reflecting the political and
cultural trends of the moment, but there are moments when films and popular
media can change how citizens think and feel about a subject, so much that
that film creates a political change. The Day After is an example of a movie
that took advantage of the nuclear fears present in America and used these
fears to their own advantage. This paper essentially functions as a case study,
analyzing how one movie can influence political activism and political leaning
from an average American citizen to the President of the United States. In our
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current oversaturated media climate. It is important that we understand the
complexities and weight that one movie can have on politics and popular
opinion of an issue. Movies such as The China Syndrome, paired with the
Three Mile Island nuclear plant meltdown created hysterical nuclear fears
across the country, but not from an attack, rather from faulty machinery or
wiring.
The Day After was a highly anticipated TV event. Across the U.S., families
came together to watch the world end on their TV sets, in their living rooms.
The images of the mushroom cloud and vaporized bodies scared these
watchers. But what really influenced Americans was the images of nuclear
radiation destroying crops, everyday ways of life, and the characters. The
fallout of nuclear radiation was what changed American’s minds about foreign
policy and ultimately placed pressure on Reagan. The Day After was a unique
and poignant example of how popular cultural and media, specifically movies,
can change public opinion on contemporary issues, and enact change at all
levels of society, and political involvement. Moving forward, consumers and
creators of media should look to The Day After and consider its impact as a
TV Movie. What other movies, TV shows, songs, etc. have had a lasting
impact and have played a role in a massive shift in opinion and political
policy?
Though this paper was originally written before the COVID-19 pandemic, in
revision it is necessary to consider how this approach to seeing media as
action can be applied to media now depicting COVID-19. Just like the Cold
War and the Nuclear crisis of the 1980s, we are living in a historic moment. In
15, 20, or 40 years, will we look back on movies and TV shows which
discussed COVID-19 and realize it changed our opinions about vaccinations or
wearing masks? By seeing media not only as a reaction to history, but an
actor in it, we are giving agency and importance to the popular media we see
every day. Going forth, consider how world events around you are depicted in
fictionalized movies, TV shows, songs, novels, etc., and consider if these
stories are affecting your opinions on the events around you, and maybe even
how far these influences could go.
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